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Abstract
Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has
presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the complete information rst-
price sealed-bid auction mechanism when the bidding space has a nite grid. This
paper aims to remedy that omission. We show that there always exists a high
price equilibriumwhich can be considered the intuitive solution(an agent with
the highest valuation wins the auction bidding at the second-highest valuation).
Although there might be other low price equilibria, we also show that when there
are two bidders the intuitive solutionis the unique limiting equilibrium when the
grid size goes to zero and ties are randomly broken.
Keywords: First-price auctions, undominated Nash equilibria.
JEL Classication Numbers:
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D44 (Auctions).
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1. Introduction
It is well known among auction theorists that the rst-price sealed-bid auction mecha-
nism under complete information does not possess a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.1
For instance, Moldovanu and Sela (2003, footnote 12) write that asymmetric Bertrand
games (and rst-price auctions) have no equilibria in pure strategies here, but intro-
ducing a smallest money unit immediately yields the intuitive solution.Conventional
wisdom holds that in this intuitive solution an agent with the highest valuation wins the
auction bidding at the second-highest valuation, which is, thus, e¢ cient. However, de-
spite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented
an elementary equilibrium analysis of the rst-price sealed-bid auction mechanism un-
der these conditions. This note aims to remedy that omission and to investigate under
which conditions the focus on the intuitive solution as an equilibrium to the rst-price
auction under complete information can be motivated by the introduction of a smallest
money unit.
There are several reasons why an analysis under complete information merits a closer
look. First, this setting is often considered a useful starting point of the analysis before
moving to incomplete information models or to be a useful benchmark case.2 Second,
1To be fully precise, it can be shown that there is no undominated pure strategy Nash equilibrium
for the rst-price auction and the only case in which a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists is when
two bidder with the highest valuation have the same valuation, see our more extensive working paper
version Alcalde and Dahm (2008).
2For the former see e.g. Baye et al. (1993) and (1996), Benoit and Krishna (2001), Bernheim and
Whinston (1986) or Krishna and Tranaes (2002)). For the latter see e.g. Anton and Yao (1989) or
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auction-theoretic ways of thinking have been successfully applied to the analysis of
broader economic questions (see Klemperer (2003)) and for some applications complete
information has been argued to be more appropriate than an incomplete information
setting.3
Although, there are alternative ways to restore existence of equilibriumlike looking
for mixed-strategy equilibria, our approach of a bidding space with a nite grid is
important. First, as the above quote shows it is a very natural procedure. Second, in
experimental settings there is also a smallest monetary unit. Third, this model is often
viewed as a better description of reality.4
The present note o¤ers an elementary analysis of pure strategy undominated Nash
equilibria assuming fairly general tie-breaking rules and (possibly irregular) nite grids
on bidding spaces. We show that there always exists the intuitive high price equilib-
riumwhich contrary to conventional wisdom might be ine¢ cient. There might also be
ine¢ cient low price equilibriawhich, when the bidding space is very restrictive, might
Moldovanu and Sela (2003)).
3For instance, Moldovanu and Sela (2003) use the rst-price auction mechanism to model patent
licensing. They report that, in the steel industry, competitors know each other well, and engineers
often visit competitorsplants.
4Simon and Zame (1990, p. 863) state this view as follows. Games with innitely many strategies
are sometimes viewed as proxies for games with a large nite number of strategies. From this point of
view it is the equilibria ... of the nite games which are of real interest; equilibria of the innite games
are merely convenient approximations.Rapoport and Amaldoss (2004, p. 587) write the assumption
of a discrete strategy space is appropriate as rms typically consider their expenditures in discrete (e.g.,
thousands or millions of dollars) rather than continuous units. Indeed, continuous strategy spaces are
mostly introduced to achieve tractability, not to provide a more adequate description of reality. Other
auction models using the assumption of a nite grid are ONeill (1986), Chwe (1989) or Rapoport and
Amaldoss (2004).
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generate very low revenues. We also show that the focus on the intuitive solution as
an equilibrium to the rst-price auction under complete information can be motivated
in the following way. When there are two bidders the intuitive solution is the unique
limiting equilibrium when the grid size goes to zero and ties are randomly broken.
2. The Model and Notation
Consider the seller of an (indivisible) object (indexed by 0) and a set of potential buyers
B = fB1; : : : ; Bi; : : : ; Bng. Each agent has a valuation vi for the object. There are at
least two buyers, i.e. n  2, and agentsvaluations are increasingly ordered, i.e. vi  vj
for all 0  i  j. All agentsvaluations v = (v0; v1; : : : ; vi; : : : ; vn) are commonly known
by all the buyers, and this is public information. As in Bernheim and Whinston (1986)
or Anton and Yao (1989) the seller only has information about her own valuation of the
object.
The nite bidding grid is formalized as follows. Let the (xed) set of prices that
buyers can propose be given by A = fa0; a1; :::; ak; :::; aKg, where ak 2 R+ and ak+1  ak
for all k = 0; 1; :::;K   1. For each such k, dene ak = ak+1   ak. We say that the
bidding space has a nite grid if there exists  > 0 such that ak   for all ak . If all
ak are equal, we say that the bidding space has a constant grid of (at least) size .
We formalize now the rst-price auction mechanism analyzed in the present paper.
Loosely speaking, the object is assigned to the buyer with highest bid, and she pays
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her bid. However, when two or more buyers propose the same bid there is a function
 establishing a probabilistic allocation rule in order to assign the object. This xed
monotonic (probabilistic) measure function  : 2B ! Rn satises:
(a) for all S  B, Pni=1 i (S) = 1,
(b) for all S  B and i 2 BnS, i (S) = 0,
(c) for all S  B and i 2 S, i (S) > 0; and
(d) for all S  S0  B, and i 2 S, i (S)  i (S0).
For A and  given, the rst-price auction mechanism proceeds as follows. Each
buyer simultaneously sets the price pi 2 A (i = 1; : : : ; n) that she is willing to pay for
the object if it is assigned to her. This denes a vector p = (p1; : : : ; pn).
(1) If pi < v0 for all i = 1; : : : ; n, the object is unassigned, i.e. the seller keeps it.
(2) Otherwise, denote by S (p) = fBi 2 B : pi  pj for all Bj 2 Bg the set of buyers
proposing the highest bid. Then the object is assigned with probability i (S (p))
to buyer Bi who pays pi with this probability.
We analyze undominated Nash equilibria (in pure strategies) in the bidding game.
Note that for each buyer Bi, a strategy p^i is undominated if, and only if, 0  p^i < vi.
We denote by wi 2 A agent Bis largest (undominated) bid strictly smaller than vi. For
simplicity we also denote wn 1 =  .
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3. Analysis of the First-Price Auction Mechanism
It turns out that if a strategy prole is an equilibrium, then it belongs to the following
class of strategy proles.
Denition 3.1. Given a 2 A, a  min fwn 1 +  ; wng, we denote by P (a) the set of
strategy prole p^ such that:
1. Buyer Bn chooses p^n = a.
2. There exists Bj 2 B n fBng such that wj = wn 1 bidding p^j = minfa;wn 1g.
3. All other bidders Bi 2 B n fBj ; Bng choose p^i  min fwi; ag.
Notice that a 2 A just indicates the winning bid.5 Given a strategy prole p^ 2 P (a),
we indicate the buyers bidding at least b 2 A by W (b) = fBi 2 B s.t. p^i  bg. To
simplify notation we will omit a and b using  and W instead, whenever this notation
is clear from the context.
5We implicitly assume in what follows that v0  a.
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Given a winning bid a and a strategy prole p^ 2 P (a), it might pay to raise or lower
an individual bid. Dene the two threshold values
 = [1  n (W (wn 1))] [vn   wn 1] and
 = max [1  j (W (a))] [vj   a]
s:t Bj 2W (a):
9>>=>>;
Notice that the denition of  might not be determined by Bn when the probabilistic
measure function  is strongly biased in favor of this buyer.6
We are now in a position to characterize undominated Nash equilibria when the
bidding space has a nite grid. There are three cases to be distinguished. Case (1) and
case (2.2) formalize the conventional wisdom that the strongest bidder just outbids the
others or ties with an equally strong bidder at their common valuation. However, case
(2.1) shows that even when valuations are di¤erent it might not pay to outbid others
because the required increase of the bid may be too large. Case (3) establishes that this
intuition might even apply to much lower bids.
Theorem 3.2. A prole of strategies p is an undominated Nash equilibrium for the
rst-price auction if, and only if, p 2 P (a) for some a 2 A; and one of the following is
true:
6The exact threshold for Bn not to determine  is that there exists Bi 2 WnBn such that n >
1  (1  i) (vi   a)=(vn   a).
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(1) (High price equilibrium, unique winner) a = wn 1 +  , wn 1 < wn and    .
(2) (High price equilibrium, tie) a = wn 1 and either
(2.1) wn 1 < wn and     or
(2.2) wn 1 = wn.
(3) (Low price equilibrium, tie) a < wn 1 and a  .
Proof. (I) We show rst that p is an undominated Nash equilibrium for the rst-
price auction whenever (1), (2) or (3) are true. Note that, since pi  wi for all Bi 2 B,
no buyer employs a dominated strategy. We show now that p is a Nash equilibrium.
Let us observe that the expected utility of buyers in B nW is zero. Moreover, given
agentsbids, no buyer in B nW can obtain a positive (expected) utility.
Suppose (1) holds. The fact that p 2 P (a) implies that Bn wins, so
Un (p
) = vn   a  0, with a = wn 1 +  .
Assume Bn changes pn to ~pn. Given that she cannot gain from raising her bid, suppose
~pn  wn 1. Notice that there exists Bj 6= Bn bidding p^j(a) = wn 1. We have
Un
 
~pn; p

 n
  n (W (wn 1)) [vn   wn 1] = vn   wn 1    
 vn   wn 1     = vn   a = Un (p) .
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And, thus, pn is the best decision for agent Bn, given the othersbids.
Suppose (2) or (3) holds. For buyer Bj 2W , we have that her expected utility is
Uj (p
) = j (W )

vj   pj

= j (W ) [vj   a] > 0.
Assume Bj changes her strategy, by setting ~pj . If she lowers her bid, her expected utility
will be zero, since W is not a singleton. Thus, suppose ~pj > a, and note that Bj will get
the object with probability one. Notice that in case (2.2) Uj

~pj ; p

 j

< 0. Consider
case (3). Observe that
Uj
 
~pj ; p

 j

= vj   ~pj  vj   a  a  vj   a   
 vj   a  [1  j (W )] [vj   a] = Uj (p) .
Again, pj is the best decision for agent Bj , given the othersbids. The argument for
case (2.1) is similar replacing Bj , a and  by Bn,   and  respectively.
(II) We show now the converse. Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium p in which all
agents employ undominated strategies. Let a0 denote the highest bid.
Notice that if a0 > minfwn 1+ ; wng, then a0 is either dominated or pn = a0. In the
latter case Bn can improve by lowering her bid. Hence, suppose a0  minfwn 1+ ; wng.
Notice that pn = a0 must hold because otherwise Bn can improve by making this
bid. Suppose a0 = wn 1 +   and that there does not exist Bj 2 B n fBng such that
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wj = wn 1 bidding pj = wn 1. Given that for bidders with lower valuations p

i = wn 1
is dominated, Bn could improve by lowering her bid. Assume a0  wn 1 and that there
exists Bj 2 B n fBng such that wj  a0 bidding pj < a0. In this case Bj can improve by
changing her bid to ~pj = a0 because
Uj (p
) = 0 < j
 
W (a0) [Bj
 
vj   a0

= Uj
 
~pj ; p

 j

This proves that p 2 P (a0). From part (I) it is clear p cannot be a undominated Nash
equilibrium when the conditions in case (1), (2) or (3) are not fullled.
Observe that case (1) and case (2) of Theorem 3.2 imply the following.
Corollary 3.3. There exists a high priceundominated Nash equilibrium in the rst-
price auction. In this equilibrium the winning bid a fullls a 2 fwn 1; wn 1 +  g.
However, in addition to this equilibrium there might be further low price equilibria
as specied in case (3) of Theorem 3.2. We give now an example in which increasing the
restrictiveness of the bidding space creates further equilibria. Notice that in applications
the relevant bidding space might be very irregular and the required increments of bids
might be large.
Example 3.4. There are two bidders with valuations v1 = 90 and v2 = 100. The
reservation price of the seller is zero. In the case that both bidders submit the same
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bid, they obtain the object with equal probability. Suppose rst that the bidding space
coincide with the set of uneven integers. In this case Theorem 3.2(1) and Corollary 3.5(1)
(stated below) imply that p = (89; 91) is the unique undominated Nash equilibrium.
However, if bidding space is A = f1; 51; 76; 89; 91; 99; 106; :::g, then apart from p there
are three additional equilibria, namely, p0 = (1; 1), p00 = (51; 51) and p000 = (76; 76).
Notice that, although A is restrictive, it still leaves the bidders a fairly rich set of options.
The intuition for the existence of the low price equilibria is the following. A bidder
can prevent a tie by outbidding the competitors by the minimal increase. However,
when the grid is restrictive the required increase is large and does not pay.7 So a
natural question to ask is, How small must a smallest monetary unit be in order to
make sure that low price equilibria do not exist? Note that, for some values of  it
is possible to have situations where wn 1 = wn but vn 1 < vn. Assume that the tie
breaking rule assigns the object with equal probability and that there are two bidders.8
Corollary 3.5. Assume that there are two bidders who get the object with equal prob-
ability in case of a tie and that the bidding space has a constant grid of size . For any
 > 0 the following is true:
7Low price equilibria may generate considerably lower revenues than high price equilibria. In this
sense there is collusion. But, given that bidding strategies constitute an equilibrium, they are also
self-enforcing. This contrasts with the conventional wisdom that unlike in a second-price auction, the
cartel agreement in a rst-price auction is not self-enforcing and, hence, is somewhat fragile(Krishna
(2002), pg. 160).
8Notice that because of the monotonicity of the tie breaking rule further bidders increase the incen-
tives to deviate from a low price equilibrium. For completeness we mention that case (1) of the next
Corollary assumes that   6= .
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(1) If wn 1 < wn, the high price equilibrium is unique.
(2) If wn 1 = wn, in addition to the high price equilibrium, there exists a low price
equilibrium with strategy prole9 p^(a) where a = wn 1   .
Proof. Suppose wn 1 < wn. The fact that vn > wn  wn 1 +  implies that
 < vn   wn 1. We show rst that the prole p^(a) with a = wn 1    is not an
equilibrium. For this  <  must hold. Since  = 12(vn wn 1+),  < 12(vn wn 1+)
must hold. Simplifying yields  < vn   wn 1, which we already have shown to be
true. Notice that no prole p^(a0) with a0 < wn 1    can be an equilibrium because
(a) = 12(vn   a) < 12(vn   a0) = (a0).
Suppose wn 1 = wn. Notice that vn wn  . This implies that  = 12(vn wn 1+
)  .
We are now in a position to come back to our initial question under which conditions
the focus on the intuitive solution as an equilibrium to the asymmetric rst-price auction
under complete information can be motivated by the introduction of a smallest monetary
unit. Notice rst that whenever the grid is ne enough wn 1 < wn holds, as in the
asymmetric game vn 1 < vn. Also, decreasing the grid guarantees that Theorem 3.2(1)
and Corollary 3.5(1) apply, implying that in the unique undominated Nash equilibrium
the bidder with the higher valuation bids a little bit more than the valuation of the
9Note that, for the two-bidder case, for any a 2 A such that a  min fwn 1 +  ; wng, P (a) is a
singleton. Therefore we can denote by p^ (a) such an element.
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other bidder and both bids di¤er only by the smallest monetary unit. The limit of this
unique undominated Nash equilibrium of the discrete asymmetric rst-price auction,
when the grid size goes to zero, is the intuitive solution.
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